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1 “Too	  Far	  Ahead	  of	  its	  Time”:	  Britain,	  Burroughs	  and	  
Real-­Time	  Banking	  in	  the	  1960s	  
Paper	  presentation	  for	  SHOT	  Annual	  Conference	  2010	  
Ian	  Martin	  University	  of	  Manchester	  and	  Open	  University,	  UK	  i.martin@open.ac.uk	  	  In	  1969,	  BBC	  television’s	  popular	  science	  and	  technology	  programme,	  Tomorrow’s	  
World,	  broadcast	  an	  item	  that	  looked	  forward	  to	  a	  banking	  system	  that	  would	  “usher	  in	  [the	  country’s]	  cashless	  economy”.1	  The	  show’s	  narrative	  of	  technological	  change	  envisioned	  point	  of	  sale	  terminals	  in	  British	  high	  street	  shops	  linked	  in	  real-­‐time	  to	  a	  central	  super	  computer.	  The	  basis	  for	  the	  show’s	  prediction	  was	  a	  plan	  by	  Britain’s	  biggest	  bank,	  Barclays,	  to	  introduce	  its	  new	  nationwide	  real-­‐time	  computer	  banking	  system	  in	  time	  for	  15	  February	  1971.	  Barclays	  was	  not	  alone.	  The	  Midland	  and	  the	  National	  Provincial	  also	  saw	  decimalisation	  day	  as	  the	  deadline	  for	  the	  real-­‐time	  computerisation	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  their	  branch	  networks.	  The	  banks	  did	  not	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  include	  point	  of	  sale	  terminals	  in	  their	  plans,	  however,	  but	  each	  did	  foresee	  its	  own	  real-­‐time	  computer	  linked	  to	  a	  national	  branch	  network	  of	  intelligent	  terminal	  satellites.	  In	  each	  case	  it	  was	  US	  computer	  manufacturer,	  Burroughs,	  that	  was	  to	  provide	  the	  banks’	  real-­‐time	  systems.	  Not	  untypically	  for	  Tomorrow’s	  World,	  its	  prediction	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  wildly	  optimistic.	  But	  so	  too	  were	  the	  ambitions	  of	  Burroughs	  and	  the	  banks.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  BBC,	  “Computerised	  Banking	  Ushers	  in	  a	  Cashless	  Economy”,	  Tomorrow’s	  World,	  first	  broadcast	  9	  December	  1969,	  available	  from:	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/tomorrowsworld/8012.shtml	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programme’s	  broadcast,	  one	  bank	  had	  already	  abandoned	  its	  plans,	  and	  relations	  between	  the	  other	  two	  and	  Burroughs	  were	  being	  sorely	  tested.	  Real-­‐time	  banking	  never	  materialised	  in	  the	  1970s,	  let	  alone	  by	  1971,	  and	  to	  varying	  degrees	  each	  project	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  failure.	  	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  examine	  the	  details	  of	  the	  Barclays’	  case	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  real-­‐time	  cashless	  ideal.	  Drawing	  upon	  oral	  testimonies	  and	  archival	  material,	  I	  offer	  Barclays’	  perspective	  on	  the	  Barclays-­‐Burroughs	  project	  to	  show	  how	  a	  community	  of	  practice	  made	  up	  of	  Barclays	  programmers	  and	  Burroughs	  engineers	  struggled	  to	  make	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  cashless	  society	  a	  real-­‐time	  banking	  reality.	  I	  explore	  the	  co-­‐construction	  of	  real-­‐time	  computing	  and	  its	  “interpretive	  flexibility”	  as	  “real-­‐time”	  became	  “on-­‐time”	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  number	  of	  material	  and	  immaterial	  difficulties.	  These	  difficulties	  –	  environmental	  challenges	  at	  the	  computer	  centre,	  delivery	  delays,	  cancellations	  and	  manpower	  shortages	  –	  exacerbated	  the	  challenges	  of	  software	  creation	  and	  resulted	  in	  the	  project’s	  eventual	  demise.	  I	  conclude	  by	  considering	  how	  both	  the	  community	  of	  practice	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  those	  responsible	  for	  the	  cashless	  society	  rhetoric	  in	  the	  air,	  came	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  project’s	  unfortunate	  end	  and	  re-­‐incorporated	  it	  into	  the	  prevailing	  technological	  discourse.	  The	  technology	  of	  real-­‐time	  computing	  for	  banking	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  cashless	  society	  was	  something	  that,	  in	  retrospect,	  both	  parties	  considered	  something	  “too	  far	  ahead	  of	  its	  time”.	  	  
Barclays	  and	  the	  real-­time	  impetus	  
Of	  all	  the	  British	  banks	  in	  the	  1960s	  it	  was	  Barclays	  that	  most	  wanted	  the	  title	  of	  technological	  innovator.	  It	  opened	  Britain’s	  first	  computer	  centre	  for	  banking	  in	  1961,2	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  For	  an	  analysis	  of	  Britain’s	  first	  computer	  centre	  for	  banking	  see	  the	  forthcoming	  (October	  2010)	  chapter,	  Ian	  Martin,	  “Britain’s	  First	  Computer	  Centre	  for	  Banking:	  What	  Did	  This	  Building	  Do?”	  in	  Technological	  
Innovation	  in	  Retail	  Finance:	  International	  Historical	  Perspectives,	  Bernardo	  Bátiz-­‐Lazo,	  Carles	  Maixé-­‐Altés,	  and	  Paul	  Thomes,	  eds.	  (Routledge,	  2010),	  37–70.	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and	  its	  launch	  of	  Barclaycard,	  an	  Anglicisation	  of	  Bank	  of	  America’s	  BankAmericard,	  was	  the	  country’s	  first	  introduction	  to	  the	  consumer	  credit	  card.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  marketing	  campaign	  for	  Barclaycard,	  Barclays	  began	  to	  play	  upon	  notions	  of	  a	  cashless	  society.	  In	  advertisements	  in	  the	  British	  press	  (see	  Figure	  1),	  it	  looked	  forward	  to	  the	  day	  when	  “sophisticated	  communities”	  would	  no	  longer	  need	  to	  rely	  on	  cash,	  which	  it	  considered	  was	  money	  in	  its	  most	  “troublesome	  form”.	  Barclaycard’s	  new	  sharp	  plastic	  edge	  was	  shown	  cutting	  through	  coins	  that	  were	  the	  “metal	  tokens”	  belonging	  to	  a	  primitive	  inefficient	  society.	  Barclaycard	  was	  positioned	  as	  a	  necessary	  next	  step	  that	  followed	  cheques	  in	  the	  inevitable	  evolution	  towards	  a	  cashless	  future.	  	  
	   PLEASE	  DO	  NOT	  CITE	  OR	  DISTRIBUTE	  WITHOUT	  AUTHOR’S	  PERMISSION	   	  4	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Barclaycard	  advertisement,	  1966.	  Source:	  “Barclays	  are	  deeply	  committed	  to	  
Barclaycard:	  Why?”	  [display	  advertising],	  The	  Times,	  15	  July	  1966.	  
Barclaycard,	  however,	  like	  branch	  accounting	  at	  Barclays’	  first	  computer	  centre,	  relied	  on	  a	  computer	  system	  that	  processed	  customer	  account	  updates	  in	  batch.	  Batch	  processing	  of	  branch	  accounts	  delayed	  the	  updates	  received	  in	  batches	  from	  branches	  throughout	  the	  day	  until	  they	  could	  be	  processed	  in	  branch	  and	  account	  order	  at	  the	  centre	  later	  the	  same	  evening.	  Printed	  lists	  of	  updated	  accounts	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ledgers	  and	  statements	  were	  then	  made	  available	  to	  the	  branches	  by	  the	  following	  morning.	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Whilst	  the	  computer	  itself	  processed	  information	  very	  quickly,	  the	  move	  from	  mechanised	  accounting	  in	  the	  branch	  to	  computer	  accounting	  at	  the	  centre	  increased	  overall	  processing	  times.	  Real-­‐time	  computing	  offered	  the	  possibility	  of	  banishing	  this	  delay.	  	   Military	  applications	  had	  provided	  a	  need	  for	  real-­‐time	  computing,	  and	  the	  reservation	  systems	  of	  major	  American	  and	  British	  airlines	  had	  proved	  its	  commercial	  viability.	  Like	  SABRE,	  real-­‐time	  computing	  for	  the	  banks	  could	  offer	  immediate	  updates	  and	  information	  retrieval,	  and	  providing	  improved	  management	  information	  and	  business	  control.3	  In	  banking,	  however,	  the	  application	  of	  real-­‐time	  computing	  was	  still	  a	  global	  frontier.	  The	  cachet	  of	  realising	  the	  world’s	  first	  real-­‐time	  banking	  system	  appealed	  to	  Barclays,	  and	  a	  draft	  internal	  memo	  revealed	  concern	  from	  an	  unnamed	  source	  that	  the	  bank	  was	  in	  danger	  of	  losing	  its	  pioneering	  position	  at	  the	  head	  of	  the	  British	  banks.4	  A	  fully-­‐integrated	  real-­‐time	  computer	  system	  comprising	  of	  a	  network	  of	  branch	  terminals	  linked	  to	  a	  computer	  at	  the	  centre	  promised	  to	  regain	  Barclays’	  lost	  status	  as	  a	  computing	  pioneer.	  The	  impending	  decimalisation	  of	  British	  currency	  precipitated	  Barclays	  towards	  real-­‐time.	  The	  issue	  of	  decimalisation	  had	  been	  raised	  many	  times	  in	  Britain.	  As	  far	  back	  as	  1831	  Charles	  Babbage	  had	  sought	  to	  rationalise	  another	  aspect	  of	  banking	  when	  he	  proposed	  a	  three-­‐step	  plan	  for	  decimalisation	  to	  the	  British	  government.5	  This	  came	  to	  nothing,	  but	  the	  debate	  rumbled	  on	  finally	  coming	  to	  a	  head	  by	  the	  early	  1960s	  as	  one-­‐by-­‐one	  the	  former	  constituents	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	  announced	  their	  own	  decimalisation	  plans.	  In	  his	  budget	  of	  1966	  the	  Chancellor	  of	  the	  Exchequer,	  James	  Callaghan,	  had	  announced	  that	  Britain	  would	  convert	  to	  decimal	  currency.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Alan	  Booth,	  The	  Management	  of	  Technical	  Change:	  Automation	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  USA	  since	  1950	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2007),	  150–151.	  4	  Barclays	  Group	  Archive	  (hereafter	  BGA)/758/32,	  “Suggested	  Basis	  for	  Local	  Head	  Office	  Circulars	  to	  Branches”,	  undated.	  	  5	  Anthony	  Hyman,	  Charles	  Babbage:	  Pioneer	  of	  the	  Computer	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1985),	  113.	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Decimalisation	  day,	  or	  “D-­‐Day”	  as	  it	  came	  to	  be	  popularly	  known,	  was	  set	  for	  15	  February	  1971.6	  The	  Chancellor’s	  announcement	  gave	  the	  state,	  businesses,	  and	  the	  public	  five	  years	  to	  prepare	  for	  the	  change	  from	  pounds	  (£),	  shillings	  (s),	  and	  pence	  (d)	  into	  the	  new	  pounds	  and	  pennies.	  The	  new	  pound	  would	  continue	  to	  have	  the	  same	  value	  as	  the	  old,	  but	  would	  be	  divided	  into	  100	  new	  pennies.	  	  The	  government’s	  decision	  to	  finally	  press	  ahead	  with	  decimalisation	  meant	  a	  massive	  enforced	  change	  for	  all	  British	  businesses.	  Banks,	  in	  particular,	  were	  under	  tremendous	  pressure	  to	  get	  the	  conversion	  right.	  Decimalisation	  not	  only	  meant	  handling	  a	  new	  currency,	  but	  required	  wholesale	  changes	  to	  accounting	  procedures	  and	  technologies	  in	  the	  branches.	  In	  1966,	  computerised	  branch	  accounting	  was	  localised	  and	  reserved	  for	  the	  biggest	  and	  busiest	  branches.	  Out	  of	  the	  2,300	  branches	  in	  its	  national	  network	  Barclays	  had	  automated	  less	  than	  100.	  In	  the	  branches,	  accounting	  machines,	  adding	  machines,	  ledger	  books,	  customer	  statements	  and	  paper	  forms	  all	  required	  replacement	  or	  conversion.	  There	  were	  significant	  costs	  associated	  with	  the	  replacement	  or	  conversion	  of	  existing	  branch	  equipment,	  procedures	  and	  stationery	  for	  decimalisation,	  much	  of	  which	  would	  be	  redundant	  after	  computerisation.	  In	  the	  computer	  centres	  too,	  accounting	  programs	  had	  to	  be	  rewritten	  and	  stationery	  had	  to	  be	  updated.	  However,	  decimal	  conversion	  of	  centralised	  computer	  centre	  branch	  accounting	  presented	  itself	  as	  a	  fairly	  quick	  and	  manageable	  task.	  The	  same	  programs	  at	  the	  centre	  did	  the	  accounting	  work	  for	  all	  branches;	  a	  change	  to	  these	  programs	  would	  change	  all	  the	  branches	  in	  one	  fell	  swoop.7	  Conversion	  of	  the	  accounting	  practices	  and	  equipment	  across	  an	  entire	  branch	  network	  was	  an	  altogether	  more	  complicated	  proposition.	  Given	  the	  complexity	  of	  change	  and	  the	  associated	  costs,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  “Mr	  Callaghan’s	  Budget	  Preview:	  50m	  Gambling	  Tax	  to	  Finance	  4¼	  p.c.	  ‘Option’	  Mortgages:	  Decimal	  Coinage	  in	  1971”,	  The	  Times,	  2	  March	  1966,	  8.	  7	  One	  Barclays’	  manager	  was	  reportedly	  quoted	  in	  a	  newspaper	  that	  the	  computerised	  conversion	  could	  be	  done	  in	  seconds,	  Gerry	  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Macclesfield,	  28	  September	  2008.	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it	  made	  economic	  sense	  for	  the	  clearing	  banks	  to	  have	  computerised	  the	  accounting	  of	  as	  many	  of	  their	  branches	  as	  possible	  before	  decimalisation	  day.	  
Enter	  Burroughs:	  agent	  of	  the	  future	  
Barclays	  had	  initially	  planned	  an	  IBM	  installation	  for	  its	  fourth	  branch	  accounting	  computer	  centre.	  Barclays’	  relationship	  with	  IBM	  was	  well	  established	  by	  this	  time,	  but	  not	  everybody	  in	  Barclays	  was	  completely	  content.	  There	  were	  some	  documented	  problems	  with	  IBM’s	  existing	  service,8	  and	  talk	  that	  their	  terminal	  units	  were	  regarded	  as	  unsuitable	  for	  Barclays’	  smaller	  branches.	  Other	  US	  office	  appliance	  manufacturers	  were	  also	  targeting	  the	  UK	  market	  intent	  on	  contesting	  IBM’s	  hegemony	  as	  computer	  supplier	  to	  four	  out	  of	  the	  “Big	  Five”	  British	  banks.9	  Of	  these,	  it	  was	  US	  computer	  supplier,	  Burroughs,	  that	  stepped	  forward	  and	  sold	  three	  out	  of	  the	  “Big	  Five”	  its	  solution	  for	  real-­‐time	  branch	  accounting.	  	  Burroughs	  was	  a	  member	  of	  a	  group	  of	  IBM’s	  seven	  biggest	  US	  rivals	  that	  the	  trade	  press	  had	  labelled	  the	  “seven	  dwarves”	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  their	  comparatively	  small	  market	  shares	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  US	  giant.10	  Burroughs’	  arrival	  in	  Britain	  pre-­‐dated	  IBM’s	  entry	  into	  the	  UK	  market	  by	  over	  fifty	  years,	  however.	  It	  had	  established	  its	  first	  sales	  office	  in	  Britain	  in	  1895	  and	  built	  its	  first	  manufacturing	  plant	  outside	  of	  the	  US	  in	  Nottingham	  three	  years	  later.11	  The	  company’s	  entrepreneurial	  founder,	  William	  Seward	  Burroughs,	  had	  worked	  in	  a	  bank	  and	  knew	  only	  too	  well	  the	  tedious	  repetition	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  BGA/758/34,	  “Computers	  –	  Summary”,	  undated.	  9	  Booth,	  The	  Management	  of	  Technical	  Change,	  151.	  10	  Martin	  Campbell-­‐Kelly	  &	  William	  Aspray,	  Computer:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Information	  Machine	  (Basicbooks,	  1996),	  135–6.	  The	  dwarves	  were	  General	  Electric	  (GE),	  Radio	  Corporation	  of	  America	  (RCA),	  Sperry	  Rand,	  Honeywell,	  Burroughs,	  National	  Cash	  Register	  (NCR),	  and	  Control	  Data	  (CDC).	  	  11	  James	  W.	  Cortada,	  Before	  the	  Computer:	  IBM,	  NCR,	  Burroughs,	  and	  Remington	  Rand	  and	  the	  Industry	  they	  
Created,	  1865–1956	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  37;	  Memorex,	  “Burroughs	  Traces	  Founding	  Back	  Nearly	  100	  years”,	  Memorex	  Intercom	  -­	  A	  Special	  Intercom	  Issue	  on	  Burroughs	  Corporation,	  December	  1981,	  1.	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that	  characterised	  much	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  bank	  clerk.	  He	  began	  his	  company	  by	  developing	  an	  adding	  machine	  that	  he	  identified	  by	  personal	  experience	  as	  fulfilling	  a	  need	  in	  the	  branch	  book-­‐keeping	  process.	  The	  company	  went	  on	  to	  produce	  a	  series	  of	  machines	  that	  fulfilled	  a	  succession	  of	  banking	  needs.	  After	  World	  War	  II	  Burroughs	  invested	  significantly	  in	  electronics	  and	  began	  to	  expand	  vigorously.	  It	  opened	  new	  factories	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  relocated	  its	  adding	  machine	  production	  facilities	  from	  Detroit	  to	  Strathleven,	  Scotland.12	  In	  1950	  its	  investment	  in	  electronics	  had	  resulted	  in	  production	  of	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  branch	  accounting	  machine	  called	  the	  Sensimatic,	  which	  it	  considered	  “the	  greatest	  advance	  in	  accounting	  machines	  in	  25	  years”.13	  	  However	  in	  the	  1950s	  Burroughs	  was	  slower	  than	  IBM	  in	  making	  the	  move	  from	  office	  equipment	  supplier	  to	  business	  computer	  supplier.	  Its	  first	  vacuum	  tube	  based	  machines	  only	  sold	  modestly	  in	  the	  1950s,14	  and	  its	  business	  computing	  efforts	  were	  largely	  focused	  on	  selling	  equipment	  that	  could	  fit	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  a	  traditional	  office	  environment.	  Of	  the	  ten	  “data	  processing”	  products	  it	  showcased	  at	  the	  Business	  Efficiency	  Exhibition	  in	  London	  in	  1959,	  its	  220	  “large-­‐scale	  computer”	  was	  the	  only	  one	  that	  would	  find	  a	  home	  in	  a	  computer	  centre.15	  In	  contrast	  to	  IBM,	  Burroughs	  had	  not	  been	  a	  manufacturer	  of	  the	  tabulators	  that	  had	  acted	  as	  a	  useful	  stepping	  stone	  in	  the	  transition	  from	  office	  appliance	  manufacturer	  to	  business	  computing	  manufacturer.	  Nonetheless	  by	  the	  1960s	  Burroughs	  had	  begun	  to	  make	  the	  transition.	  Like	  IBM,	  its	  first	  inroads	  into	  large-­‐scale	  computing	  with	  the	  British	  Banks	  were	  via	  cheque	  sorter	  readers.	  Lloyds	  ordered	  a	  Burroughs	  cheque	  sorter-­‐reader	  in	  1960,	  and	  followed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Booth,	  The	  Management	  of	  Technical	  Change,	  40.	  13	  Memorex,	  “Burroughs	  Traces	  Founding	  Back	  Nearly	  100	  years”,	  2.	  14	  Jeffrey	  R.	  Yost,	  The	  Computer	  Industry	  (Greenwood	  Publishing	  Group,	  2005),	  62.	  15	  “Burroughs”	  [display	  advertising],	  The	  Times,	  11	  May	  1959.	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this	  up	  with	  an	  order	  for	  a	  Burroughs	  B270	  computer	  in	  1962.16	  The	  Midland	  ordered	  a	  total	  of	  ten	  Burroughs	  sorter-­‐readers	  to	  be	  controlled	  by	  a	  Burroughs	  B370	  by	  1965.17	  Burroughs’	  cheque	  encoding	  machines,	  used	  in	  the	  branch	  to	  print	  the	  amount	  in	  magnetic	  ink	  on	  cheques	  paid	  in	  over	  the	  counter,	  had	  a	  three-­‐quarters	  majority	  share	  of	  the	  British	  market.18	  Burroughs	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  close	  links	  it	  had	  forged	  with	  the	  banks	  to	  position	  itself	  as	  fulfilling	  a	  niche	  requirement	  in	  the	  business	  computing	  marketplace.	  In	  1965	  Burroughs	  stepped	  up	  its	  computer	  sales	  efforts	  to	  the	  British	  banks	  by	  expanding	  its	  London	  sales	  office	  and	  creating	  a	  “London-­‐Banks”	  office	  dedicated	  to	  serving	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  clearing	  banks.	  Its	  sales	  team	  aggressively	  went	  after	  new	  business,	  seeking	  to	  persuade	  the	  banks	  to	  change	  commitments	  to	  existing	  computer	  suppliers	  and	  instead	  buy	  Burroughs.	  Burroughs	  competed	  simultaneously	  on	  four	  fronts.	  First,	  it	  competed	  on	  price,	  offering	  to	  undercut	  the	  competition.	  Second,	  it	  levered	  its	  long-­‐standing	  links	  with	  the	  British	  banks	  to	  promote	  itself	  as	  fully	  understanding	  their	  specific	  needs.	  Third,	  it	  competed	  on	  technical	  excellence,	  waxing	  lyrical	  about	  the	  virtues	  of	  its	  integrated	  hardware	  and	  software	  developments.19	  Fourth,	  it	  was	  intent	  on	  selling	  itself	  as	  the	  business	  automation	  company	  of	  the	  future,	  declaring	  in	  advertisements	  in	  newspapers	  and	  trade	  journals	  that	  it	  was	  “bringing	  business	  automation	  to	  far-­‐sighted	  companies”.20	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Lloyds	  Bank	  Group	  Archives	  (hereafter	  LBGA)/Winton	  File:	  “Computers,	  Howland	  2.11.77”;	  “Lloyds	  Bank	  Order	  £120,000	  Computer”,	  The	  Times,	  13	  November	  1962,	  21.	  17	  “Further	  Automation	  by	  Midland	  Bank”,	  The	  Times,	  1	  February	  1965,	  20.	  18	  Anthony	  Harris,	  “How	  Burroughs	  got	  £20m	  out	  of	  the	  Banks”,	  Financial	  Times,	  7	  April	  1967,	  13.	  19	  Gerry	  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Macclesfield,	  26	  September	  2008;	  David	  Parsons,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Manchester,	  7	  August	  2008.	  20	  Booth,	  The	  Management	  of	  Technical	  Change,	  41;	  Anthony	  Harris,	  “How	  Burroughs	  got	  £20m	  out	  of	  the	  Banks”,	  Financial	  Times,	  7	  April	  1967,	  13.	  Quote	  from	  Burroughs	  advertisement	  in	  “Banking:	  A	  Financial	  Times	  Survey”,	  Financial	  Times,	  22	  May	  1967,	  24.	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Barclays	  had	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  relationship	  with	  Burroughs,	  preferring	  to	  do	  business	  with	  NCR	  for	  its	  branch	  equipment,21	  but	  Burroughs	  extolled	  the	  virtues	  of	  its	  intelligent	  TC	  500	  terminals	  for	  the	  branch	  and	  its	  B8500	  computer	  in	  the	  computer	  centre.	  This	  was	  a	  combination	  that	  it	  promised	  would	  be	  powerful	  enough	  to	  handle	  the	  bank’s	  entire	  branch	  accounting	  needs.	  	  
The	  B8500	  Computer	  Burroughs	  had	  gained	  its	  initial	  real-­‐time	  experience	  working	  as	  a	  subcontractor	  on	  the	  SAGE	  project	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  US	  government	  sponsored	  projects.	  To	  the	  private	  sector,	  it	  marketed	  its	  500	  series	  machines	  as	  on-­‐line	  and	  real-­‐time	  systems	  particularly	  suited	  to	  financial	  applications.22	  	  The	  range	  began	  with	  the	  entry-­‐level	  B5500,	  the	  commercial	  counterpart	  of	  its	  D825	  military	  real-­‐time	  machine.	  At	  the	  top	  of	  the	  range	  was	  the	  B8500	  supercomputer.	  Produced	  by	  the	  Burroughs	  Defense,	  Space	  and	  Special	  Systems	  Group,	  the	  B8500’s	  origins	  were	  as	  a	  high-­‐speed	  scientific	  computer	  for	  the	  US	  Atomic	  Energy	  Commission.	  It	  shared	  the	  integrated	  modular	  design	  found	  in	  the	  B5500,	  expanding	  the	  concept	  further	  to	  offer	  a	  maximum	  of	  16	  interconnected	  processors	  and	  I/O	  modules.23	  The	  B8500	  represented	  Burroughs’	  biggest	  and	  most	  ambitious	  system	  to	  date,	  which	  Burroughs	  set	  about	  marketing	  outside	  of	  the	  defence	  and	  space	  fields,	  trumpeting	  it	  as	  “the	  most	  powerful	  computer	  system	  ever	  designed”.24	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Gerry	  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  28	  September	  2008.	  22	  Martin	  Campbell-­‐Kelly,	  ICL:	  A	  Business	  and	  Technical	  History	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  23;	  BGA/725/3,	  Alan	  Duncan,	  interview	  with	  Jessie	  Campbell,	  11	  August	  1998.	  	  23	  Burroughs	  Corporation	  Defense,	  Space	  and	  Special	  Systems	  Group,	  “B8500	  Information	  Processing	  System”,	  c.	  1966.	  24	  George	  T.	  Gray	  and	  Ronald	  Q.	  Smith,	  “After	  the	  B5000:	  Burroughs	  Third-­‐Generation	  Computers	  1964–1980”,	  IEEE	  Annals	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Computing	  31,	  no.	  2	  (2009):	  48;	  Burroughs	  Corporation,	  “Burroughs	  B2500	  and	  B3500	  Electronic	  Data	  Processing	  Systems:	  A	  New	  Level	  of	  Computer	  Responsiveness”,	  March	  1966.	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In	  addition	  to	  the	  American	  defence	  contract,	  Burroughs	  already	  had	  a	  $20	  million	  order	  from	  US	  Steel	  and	  a	  $15	  million	  order	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Wisconsin.25	  	  Burroughs	  demonstrated	  the	  machine’s	  technical	  pedigree	  to	  senior	  Barclays	  analysts	  and	  programmers	  who	  were	  invited	  on	  tours	  of	  Burroughs	  Research	  Unit	  in	  Detroit	  and	  installations	  at	  US	  Steel	  and	  the	  North	  American	  Air	  Defense	  (NORAD)	  combat	  operations	  centre	  inside	  the	  Cheyenne	  mountain	  near	  Colorado	  Springs.26	  At	  US	  Steel,	  Burroughs	  was	  building	  a	  B8500	  to	  order	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  real-­‐time	  control	  system.	  Although	  Barclays’	  representatives	  didn’t	  know	  it	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  machine	  they	  saw	  “in	  bits	  on	  the	  floor”	  would	  never	  be	  a	  finished	  machine.	  US	  Steel	  continually	  changed	  its	  requirements	  and	  although	  Burroughs	  attempted	  to	  respond	  with	  modifications	  to	  increase	  processing	  power,27	  the	  machine	  was	  unreliable	  and	  Burroughs	  was	  unable	  to	  rectify	  its	  flaws	  cost	  effectively.28	  	  At	  NORAD,	  Barclays’	  people	  were	  presumably	  flattered	  to	  have	  been	  granted	  privileged	  access,	  and	  most	  definitely	  impressed	  by	  what	  they	  saw	  inside.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  complex	  was	  a	  Burroughs	  computing	  behemoth,	  a	  D825	  multiprocessor	  computer	  that	  used	  radar	  and	  satellite	  input	  to	  make	  real-­‐time	  evaluations	  of	  incoming	  threats	  to	  the	  North	  American	  continent.29	  Its	  multiprocessor	  architecture	  meant	  that	  not	  only	  did	  it	  offer	  high	  performance,	  but	  that	  it	  also	  boasted	  non-­‐stop	  capabilities	  with	  one	  processor	  providing	  backup	  for	  the	  other	  in	  event	  of	  failure.	  This	  was	  an	  important	  selling	  point	  for	  a	  complete	  solution	  that	  relied	  a	  single	  computer	  at	  its	  centre	  and	  Barclays’	  representatives	  judged	  the	  Burroughs	  machine	  to	  offer	  superior	  reliability	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  “Computing	  Success”,	  Time	  Magazine,	  23	  December	  1966.	  26	  Alan	  Duncan,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Snettisham,	  23	  September	  2008.	  27	  Gerry	  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Macclesfield,	  26	  September	  2008.	  28	  Gray	  and	  Smith,	  “After	  the	  B5000”,	  48.	  29	  Memorex,	  “Burroughs	  traces	  founding	  back	  nearly	  100	  years”,	  1;	  Joyce	  A.	  Post,	  “The	  Burroughs	  Research	  Center	  in	  Paoli”,	  Tredyffrin	  Easttown	  Historical	  Society	  History	  Quarterly	  40,	  no.	  1	  (January	  2003):	  3–18.	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comparison	  to	  its	  competitors.30	  The	  visiting	  team	  was	  also	  impressed	  by	  the	  synergy	  between	  Burroughs’	  hardware	  and	  software	  teams,	  of	  which	  one	  of	  the	  results	  was	  an	  automatic	  “self-­‐discovery”	  of	  any	  changes	  in	  hardware	  configuration	  at	  Initial	  Program	  Load	  (IPL).	  Burroughs	  was	  judged	  by	  the	  Barclays	  technicians	  to	  be	  organisationally	  and	  technically	  very	  advanced	  and	  able	  to	  offer	  machines	  with	  superior	  technology	  and	  system	  reliability	  to	  those	  of	  the	  firm’s	  competitors,	  particularly	  those	  from	  IBM.31	  
The	  TC	  500	  intelligent	  terminal	  It	  was	  the	  appeal	  of	  Burroughs’	  programmable	  branch	  terminal,	  the	  TC	  500,	  however,	  that	  led	  Barclays	  to	  its	  all-­‐Burroughs	  solution.32	  The	  TC	  500	  offered	  an	  intelligent	  terminal	  interface	  to	  its	  operator	  within	  the	  branch,	  and	  was	  judged	  by	  one	  of	  its	  Barclays’	  programmers	  to	  be	  “streets	  ahead	  of	  anything	  else	  at	  the	  time”.33	  Barclays	  programmers	  could	  write	  programs	  for	  the	  TC	  500	  which	  were	  stored	  on	  coloured	  paper	  tapes.	  An	  operator	  in	  the	  branch	  would	  load	  up	  different	  programs	  in	  order	  to	  perform	  different	  branch	  accounting	  tasks.34	  Figure	  2	  shows	  a	  Burroughs	  TC	  500	  in	  Burroughs’	  advertising	  literature	  of	  the	  time.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  BGA/725/3,	  Alan	  Duncan,	  interview	  with	  Jessie	  Campbell,	  11	  August	  1998.	  31	  Stan	  Gray,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Haslington,	  22	  July	  2008.	  32	  Gerry	  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Macclesfield,	  26	  September	  2008.	  33	  BGA/725/3,	  Alan	  Duncan,	  interview	  with	  Jessie	  Campbell,	  11	  August	  1998;	  Peter	  Blackburn,	  telephone	  interview	  with	  author,	  21	  July	  2008.	  34	  Margaret	  Shilleto,	  telephone	  interview	  with	  author,	  5	  August	  2008.	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Figure	  2.	  A	  Burroughs	  TC	  500.	  Source:	  Burroughs	  TC	  500	  Terminal	  Computer:	  Introduces	  a	  New	  
Approach	  to	  On-­Line	  Systems	  Design,	  c.	  1967,	  2.	  	  Burroughs	  had	  long	  been	  developing	  accounting	  machines	  for	  the	  banks,	  and	  they	  had	  become	  increasingly	  sophisticated.	  Its	  Sensimatic	  machine,	  launched	  in	  1950,	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incorporated	  a	  programmable	  control	  panel,35	  and	  headlines	  in	  Burroughs’	  advertisements	  declared	  it	  “A	  Completely	  New	  Accounting	  Machine”.	  The	  copy	  underneath	  stressed	  its	  general	  purpose	  nature	  and	  suggested	  comparisons	  to	  a	  computer	  by	  describing	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  “astonishing	  versatility”	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  incorporation	  of	  a	  “mechanical	  brain”	  which	  meant	  there	  was	  “no	  limit	  to	  the	  number	  of	  accounting	  jobs	  the	  Sensimatic	  [could]	  do”.36	  In	  1951,	  Burroughs	  had	  tried	  to	  convince	  the	  Bank	  of	  America	  to	  adopt	  modified	  Sensimatics	  as	  the	  heart	  of	  its	  ERMA	  system,	  but	  the	  bank	  turned	  down	  the	  proposal.37	  	   Five	  years	  later,	  and	  the	  Sensimatic	  had	  evolved	  into	  the	  Sensitronic.	  Lloyds	  was	  the	  first	  British	  bank	  to	  make	  use	  of	  a	  Sensitronic	  for	  branch	  accounting	  in	  1960.	  Equipped	  with	  two	  printing	  heads,	  it	  could	  print	  ledgers	  and	  customer	  statements	  simultaneously,	  and	  accounting	  information,	  including	  a	  customer	  account	  number	  and	  current	  balance,	  was	  also	  stored	  on	  three	  magnetic	  stripes	  on	  the	  back	  of	  the	  ledger	  card.38	  One	  press	  report	  remarked	  that	  a	  demonstration	  machine	  even	  glowed	  red	  when	  it	  reached	  an	  overdrawn	  account.39	  Use	  of	  the	  machines	  required	  internal	  use	  of	  account	  numbers	  within	  the	  branch,	  but	  Burroughs	  figured	  that	  the	  banks,	  already	  accustomed	  to	  ledgers	  as	  a	  visible	  record	  of	  accounting	  information,	  would	  not	  see	  this	  as	  prohibitive	  because	  the	  Sensitronic	  was	  making	  use	  of	  familiar	  “visible	  record”	  technologies:	  the	  ledger	  and	  the	  statement.	  	  Burroughs’	  management	  understood	  that	  the	  technologies	  of	  office	  appliances	  and	  computers	  were	  converging.40	  In	  Burroughs’	  evolution	  of	  bank	  office	  equipment,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Booth,	  The	  Management	  of	  Technical	  Change,	  40.	  36	  “A	  Completely	  New	  Accounting	  Machine”	  [display	  advertising],	  Economist,	  18	  October	  1952.	  37	  Amy	  W.	  Fisher	  and	  James	  L.	  McKenney,	  “The	  Development	  of	  the	  ERMA	  Banking	  System:	  Lessons	  from	  History”,	  IEEE	  Annals	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Computing	  15,	  no.	  1	  (1993),	  49.	  38	  “Lloyds	  Bank	  Electronic	  Accounting	  Machine”,	  The	  Times,	  4	  July	  1960.	  39	  “Bank	  Machine	  Glows	  Red	  for	  Overdrafts”,	  The	  Times,	  1	  July	  1958.	  40	  Franklin	  M.	  Fisher,	  James	  W.	  McKie,	  and	  Richard	  B.	  Mancke,	  IBM	  and	  the	  US	  Data	  Processing	  Industry:	  An	  
Economic	  History	  (Praeger,	  1983),	  249.	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TC	  500s	  came	  next.	  Seen	  as	  the	  missing	  link	  between	  large-­‐scale	  computing	  developments	  and	  office	  machines	  the	  TC	  500	  was	  Burroughs’	  intelligent	  branch	  terminal.	  Connected	  to	  a	  Burroughs	  large-­‐scale	  computer	  a	  TC	  500	  could	  make	  “visible”	  to	  the	  branch	  in	  real-­‐time	  the	  customer	  records	  at	  the	  centre.	  It	  was	  a	  sophisticated	  programmable	  electro-­‐mechanical	  machine	  that	  had	  three	  processors	  and	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  computer	  in	  its	  own	  right.41	  The	  Financial	  Times	  reported	  one	  claim	  that	  there	  was	  the	  same	  calculating	  capacity	  in	  this	  small	  office	  machine	  as	  there	  had	  been	  in	  an	  IBM	  1401.42	  	  The	  TC	  500’s	  power	  was	  stressed	  in	  Burroughs’	  advertising	  literature	  as	  fulfilling	  an	  important	  contributing	  role	  towards	  a	  balanced	  computing	  system	  where	  processing	  was	  shared	  between	  remote	  terminal	  and	  central	  computer.43	  
A	  complete	  solution	  Burroughs	  offered	  Barclays	  the	  computing	  capacity	  for	  its	  own	  real-­‐time	  national	  computing	  network	  comprising	  a	  Burroughs	  B8500	  at	  the	  centre	  and	  a	  network	  of	  Burroughs	  TC	  500	  terminals	  in	  the	  branches.	  It	  was	  a	  system	  that	  was	  claimed	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  providing	  an	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  response	  to	  any	  branch	  transaction	  within	  two	  and	  a	  half	  seconds,	  and	  able	  to	  handle	  a	  million	  of	  these	  transactions	  every	  hour.44	  Incredibly,	  Burroughs	  offered	  all	  this	  to	  Barclays	  for	  half	  the	  price	  of	  IBM’s	  proposed	  £23	  million	  solution.45	  Barclays	  dropped	  IBM	  in	  favour	  of	  Burroughs	  as	  the	  new	  supplier	  of	  the	  computing	  technologies	  that	  would	  decimalise	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  branch	  accounting.	  On	  2	  March	  1967	  it	  placed	  an	  £11,500,000	  order	  with	  Burroughs	  for	  one	  B8500,	  priced	  at	  £4.5	  million,	  and	  2,300	  TC	  500	  branch	  terminals.46	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  David	  Parsons,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Manchester,	  7	  August	  2008.	  42	  “D-­‐Day	  Ushers	  in	  the	  Mini-­‐Computer”,	  Financial	  Times,	  21	  April	  1969,	  29.	  43	  Burroughs,	  Burroughs	  TC	  500	  Terminal	  Computer:	  Introduces	  a	  New	  Approach	  to	  On-­Line	  Systems	  Design,	  c.	  1967,	  2.	  44	  “Business	  Notes”,	  Communications	  of	  the	  ACM	  10,	  no.	  5	  (1967):	  330.	  45	  Ackrill	  and	  Hannah,	  Barclays,	  332–334.	  46	  “Barclay	  [sic]	  £11½m.	  Computer	  Buy”,	  The	  Times,	  30	  March	  1967,	  15.	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Barclays’	  order	  was	  then	  quickly	  followed	  by	  one	  from	  the	  National	  Provincial.	  In	  February	  the	  following	  year	  both	  banks	  were	  followed	  by	  the	  Midland,	  which	  was	  experiencing	  difficulties	  in	  its	  relationship	  with	  English	  Electric	  Leo	  Marconi.47	  Three	  out	  of	  the	  British	  “Big	  Five”	  banks	  had	  switched	  to	  Burroughs	  as	  their	  computing	  supplier	  and	  were	  intent	  on	  realising	  real-­‐time	  automated	  branch	  accounting	  in	  time	  for	  decimalisation.	  The	  other	  two	  big	  British	  banks,	  Lloyds	  and	  the	  Westminster,	  stayed	  committed	  to	  IBM,	  and,	  to	  differing	  degrees,	  committed	  to	  batch	  processing.	  Burroughs,	  proud	  of	  its	  coup,	  made	  sure	  the	  rest	  of	  British	  business	  knew	  about	  it.	  Figure	  3	  shows	  an	  advertisement	  it	  published	  in	  the	  Financial	  Times	  of	  22	  May	  1967,	  following	  the	  orders.	  	  
	  
Figure	  3.	  Burroughs	  advertisement	  published	  in	  a	  banking	  supplement	  of	  the	  Financial	  Times,	  22	  
May	  1967.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  The	  Midland	  placed	  an	  order	  of	  £5m	  for	  two	  Burroughs	  B6500	  computers,	  see	  Kenneth	  Owen,	  “Blow	  for	  Computer	  Merger”,	  The	  Times,	  24	  February	  1968,	  11.	  It	  had	  already	  invested	  heavily	  in	  Burroughs	  equipment	  for	  the	  branches.	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Although	  Barclays	  had	  done	  little	  business	  with	  Burroughs	  up	  until	  this	  point,	  preferring	  to	  partner	  with	  NCR	  for	  its	  branch	  accounting	  equipment,48	  this	  was	  not	  regarded	  as	  a	  significant	  issue.	  Barclays’	  first	  computing	  supplier	  had	  been	  EMI,	  and	  IBM	  had	  only	  recently	  begun	  to	  dominate	  as	  first-­‐choice	  supplier	  to	  Barclays	  and	  the	  other	  British	  banks.	  The	  computing	  landscape	  was	  by	  no	  means	  clear,	  and	  Burroughs’	  real-­‐time	  computing	  offered	  Barclays	  the	  opportunity	  to	  further	  its	  ambitions	  for	  the	  position	  of	  technological	  innovator,	  and	  do	  so	  at	  an	  affordable	  price.	  It	  reckoned	  its	  new	  system	  would	  be	  the	  largest	  real-­‐time	  banking	  system	  anywhere	  in	  the	  world.49	  Now	  it	  was	  not	  just	  cash	  that	  was	  portrayed	  as	  outdated	  and	  dangerous	  as	  Barclaycard	  and	  Tomorrows’	  
World	  had	  cast	  it,	  Barclays	  wanted	  the	  batch	  mode	  of	  computerised	  branch	  accounting	  to	  look	  decidedly	  old	  fashioned.	  However,	  tomorrow’s	  banking	  world	  was	  still	  years	  away.	  Lead	  times	  from	  order	  to	  delivery	  of	  large-­‐scale	  computers	  were	  still	  typically	  eighteen	  months	  to	  two	  years,	  and	  installation	  of	  the	  Burroughs’	  B8500	  super	  computer	  was	  promised	  for	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1969.50	  Barclays	  saw	  nothing	  unusual	  in	  such	  a	  wait,	  and	  in	  the	  meantime	  looked	  for	  a	  space	  to	  house	  the	  new	  computer.	  	  There	  was	  no	  need	  to	  wait	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  Burroughs	  large-­‐scale	  computer	  to	  make	  use	  of	  the	  TC	  500s,	  however;	  the	  branch	  terminals	  could	  operate	  as	  standalone	  book-­‐keeping	  machines	  capable	  of	  being	  used	  for	  both	  £sd	  and	  decimal	  working	  with	  some	  reprogramming.51	  The	  bank	  was	  intent	  on	  replacing	  the	  non-­‐decimal	  NCR	  160	  and	  3204	  accounting	  machines	  in	  the	  branches	  with	  TC	  500s	  as	  fast	  as	  Burroughs	  could	  make	  them	  available.52	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Gerry	  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Macclesfield,	  26	  September	  2008.	  49	  Ackrill	  and	  Hannah,	  Barclays,	  333–334.	  50	  “Business	  Notes”,	  Communications	  of	  the	  ACM	  10,	  no.	  5	  (1967):	  330.	  51	  BGA/758/32,	  “Suggested	  Basis	  for	  Local	  Head	  Office	  Circulars	  to	  Branches”,	  undated.	  52	  BGA/758/34,	  “Computers	  –	  Summary”,	  undated.	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Close	  to	  the	  machine	  
In	  the	  spring	  of	  1967,	  Barclays	  began	  assembling	  a	  team	  of	  analysts	  and	  two	  programming	  teams	  that	  would	  realise	  its	  real-­‐time	  banking	  vision.	  The	  first	  of	  the	  two	  programming	  teams	  was	  an	  applications	  team	  that	  would	  write	  the	  real-­‐time	  branch	  accounting	  applications.	  The	  second	  was	  a	  small	  technical	  team	  assembled,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  one	  of	  its	  members,	  in	  order	  to	  “get	  to	  grips	  with	  [the	  B8500]	  in	  its	  technical	  glory”.	  This	  team	  was	  made	  up	  of	  the	  bank’s	  most	  experienced	  and	  skilled	  programmers	  drawn	  from	  other	  Barclays’	  computer	  projects.	  Appointed	  team	  leader	  of	  this	  team	  was	  programmer	  of	  the	  batch	  branch	  accounting	  programs	  at	  the	  bank’s	  second	  and	  third	  computer	  centres,	  Stan	  Gray.	  Gray	  brought	  with	  him	  a	  colleague	  who	  had	  worked	  alongside	  him	  programming	  the	  IBM	  System/360.	  They	  were	  joined	  by	  David	  Parsons	  who	  had	  cut	  his	  programming	  teeth	  on	  the	  EMIDEC	  machine	  at	  the	  bank’s	  first	  computer	  centre.	  These	  men,	  who	  were	  bank	  clerks	  five	  years	  previously,	  were	  now	  the	  bank’s	  expert	  programmers	  and	  were	  complemented	  by	  a	  number	  of	  computing	  outsiders	  recruited	  for	  their	  technical	  specialisms.	  Fresh	  from	  Barclaycard	  was	  the	  bank’s	  first	  computing	  outsider,	  Alan	  Duncan,	  who,	  as	  the	  bank’s	  chief	  systems	  analyst,	  was	  in	  overall	  charge	  of	  the	  real-­‐time	  banking	  project.	  53	  The	  technical	  team’s	  brief	  was	  to	  understand	  what	  could	  be	  done	  with	  the	  Burroughs	  machines	  by	  working	  “close	  to	  the	  machine”	  and	  advising	  the	  applications	  team	  accordingly.	  The	  machines	  the	  team	  had	  to	  understand	  were	  both	  the	  Burroughs	  large-­‐scale	  B8500	  computer	  and	  the	  smaller-­‐scale	  TC	  500s	  that	  would	  be	  installed	  in	  the	  branches.	  Getting	  close	  to	  the	  B8500	  presented	  a	  considerable	  challenge	  as	  the	  machine	  would	  not	  be	  ready	  for	  delivery	  for	  another	  two	  years.54	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  David	  Parsons,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Manchester,	  7	  August	  2008.	  54	  Ibid.	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Learning	  in	  a	  community	  of	  practice	  Meanwhile,	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1968,	  one	  of	  the	  applications	  programming	  team	  attended	  a	  CUBE	  (Cooperating	  Users	  of	  Burroughs	  Equipment)	  meeting	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  CUBE	  was	  a	  computer	  user	  group	  for	  Burroughs’	  customers	  similar	  to	  SHARE,	  set	  up	  by	  the	  scientific	  and	  technical	  users	  of	  IBM	  computers,	  and	  GUIDE	  (Guidance	  for	  Users	  of	  Integrated	  Data	  processing	  Equipment),	  an	  association	  of	  commercial	  data	  processing	  users.	  Its	  purpose,	  like	  SHARE	  and	  GUIDE,	  was	  to	  share	  knowledge,	  ideas,	  practices	  and	  programs	  and	  to	  develop	  standards.55	  It	  was	  a	  formal	  incarnation	  of	  what	  educational	  theorist	  Etienne	  Wenger	  would	  consider	  a	  “community	  of	  practice”.56	  At	  the	  meeting,	  a	  Burroughs’	  representative	  shared	  his	  knowledge	  that	  the	  B8500	  was	  in	  delay	  and	  Burroughs	  was	  about	  to	  offer	  Barclays	  two	  B6500s	  as	  a	  temporary	  solution.	  Not	  only	  was	  this	  interim	  solution	  less	  than	  satisfactory,	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  had	  been	  communicated	  to	  the	  bank	  was	  deemed	  wholly	  inappropriate.	  Barclays’	  senior	  managers	  regarded	  as	  disrespectful	  Burroughs	  decision	  to	  relay	  something	  of	  this	  magnitude	  to	  a	  chief	  programmer	  at	  a	  user	  group	  meeting	  rather	  than	  communicating	  it	  directly	  to	  them	  was	  seen	  as	  disrespectful.57	  As	  a	  stopgap	  and	  peace	  offering	  until	  delivery	  of	  the	  first	  of	  the	  B6500s,	  Burroughs	  supplied	  Barclays	  with	  a	  B5500	  machine	  which	  shared	  a	  similar,	  if	  not	  truly	  compatible,	  modular	  multiprocessor	  architecture	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  For	  more	  on	  CUBE,	  see	  David	  Alan	  Grier,	  “Working	  Class	  Hero”,	  Computer	  40,	  no.	  5	  (2007):	  8–10.	  For	  corporate	  collaboration	  and	  voluntarism	  in	  SHARE,	  which	  was	  generally	  capitalised	  by	  its	  members	  but	  is	  not	  an	  acronym,	  see	  Atsushi	  Akera,	  “Voluntarism	  and	  the	  Fruits	  of	  Collaboration:	  The	  IBM	  User	  Group,	  Share”,	  Technology	  and	  Culture	  42,	  no.	  4	  (2001):	  710–736.	  For	  GUIDE,	  see	  Deborah	  Sojka	  and	  Philip	  H.	  Dorn,	  “Magic	  Moments	  in	  Software,	  Datamation	  29,	  no.	  9	  (1981):	  7–16	  cited	  in	  Richard	  Hull,	  In	  Praise	  of	  Wimps:	  
Social	  History	  of	  Programming	  –	  Some	  Work	  in	  Progress	  –	  Including	  a	  Chronology	  and	  an	  Extensive	  
Bibliography	  (Alice	  Publications,	  1992). 56	  For	  an	  introduction	  see	  Etienne	  Wenger,	  Communities	  of	  Practice:	  Learning,	  Meaning	  and	  Identity	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1998).	  57	  Brian	  Hull,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Wilmslow,	  21	  October	  2008.	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with	  the	  B8500	  albeit	  on	  a	  much	  smaller	  scale.	  Barclays	  might	  not	  have	  been	  happy,	  but	  its	  programmers	  were	  at	  least	  able	  to	  begin	  testing.58	  The	  B5500,	  like	  the	  B8500,	  was	  new	  to	  the	  UK	  market	  and	  there	  was	  little	  British	  experience.	  Barclays’	  technical	  team	  began	  working	  closely	  with	  Burroughs’	  engineers,	  forming	  a	  smaller,	  tightly-­‐knit	  community	  of	  practice,	  to	  quickly	  gain	  experience	  of	  the	  machine’s	  capabilities.	  The	  team	  soon	  realised	  both	  the	  B5500	  and	  the	  TC	  500s	  were	  sophisticated	  machines,	  but	  that	  Burroughs	  had	  not	  yet	  worked	  out	  how	  they	  would	  work	  in	  harmony	  as	  a	  real-­‐time	  system.	  Telecommunications	  between	  multiple	  processors	  in	  multiple	  terminals	  connected	  over	  multiple	  lines	  to	  a	  multiprocessor	  computer	  wasn’t	  catered	  for	  in	  the	  B5500’s	  operating	  system.	  The	  real-­‐time	  systems	  up	  to	  this	  point	  –	  including	  those	  from	  IBM	  as	  well	  as	  Burroughs	  –	  had	  made	  use	  of	  dumb	  rather	  than	  intelligent	  terminals.	  The	  sophistication	  of	  the	  TC	  500	  added	  an	  extra	  layer	  of	  complexity	  with	  which	  Burroughs	  and	  Barclays	  had	  to	  deal.	  Then	  exploded	  a	  first	  bombshell.	  The	  Burroughs’	  engineer	  who	  was	  to	  design	  and	  write	  the	  software	  for	  data	  communication	  between	  the	  TC	  500s	  and	  the	  B5500	  computer	  left	  Burroughs.	  Burroughs	  had	  nobody	  else	  available	  to	  replace	  him.	  The	  Burroughs’	  programming	  job	  was	  picked	  up	  in	  1968	  by	  Barclays’	  David	  Parsons,	  a	  former	  bank	  clerk	  turned	  EMIDEC	  computer	  programmer	  at	  Barclays	  first	  computer	  centre.	  His	  new	  team	  leader,	  Stan	  Gray	  had	  faith	  in	  him	  picking	  up	  the	  challenge	  of	  getting	  the	  TC	  500s	  to	  communicate	  effectively	  to	  the	  B5500	  computer.	  The	  branch	  accounting	  programmes	  for	  the	  EMIDECs	  and	  the	  IBM	  System/360s	  at	  the	  banks	  other	  computer	  centres	  had	  been	  written	  in	  machine	  code	  and	  Assembly	  language.	  The	  application	  programs	  for	  the	  new	  Burroughs	  real-­‐time	  branch	  accounting	  system	  were	  to	  be	  written	  in	  COBOL,	  which	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  B8500,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  get	  the	  TC	  500	  machines	  in	  the	  branch	  to	  communicate	  with	  the	  central	  computer	  required	  coding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  BGA/758/34,	  “Computers	  –	  Summary”,	  undated.	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at	  a	  lower	  level.	  Although	  the	  B8500	  and	  B5500	  were	  in	  the	  same	  Burroughs	  “family”	  of	  computers,	  they	  were	  not	  machine-­‐language	  compatible	  like	  IBM	  S/360;	  compatibility	  was	  achieved	  through	  the	  use	  of	  higher-­‐level	  languages.59	  All	  of	  the	  system	  software	  for	  the	  B8500	  was	  written	  in	  ALGOL	  (ALGOrithmic	  Language).60	  It	  was	  ALGOL	  that	  David	  Parsons	  set	  about	  learning	  from	  the	  Burroughs-­‐supplied	  manuals	  while	  Barclays	  waited	  for	  the	  installation	  of	  the	  Burroughs	  B5500	  machine	  at	  Willesden.	  David	  worked	  with	  another	  computer	  specialist	  Barclays	  had	  recruited	  from	  outside	  the	  bank,	  Peter	  Atkins.	  The	  two	  shared	  a	  similar	  strong	  work	  ethic	  and	  were	  soon	  deeply	  immersed	  in	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  TC	  500	  and	  the	  B5500.	  One	  weekend	  the	  two	  of	  them	  took	  a	  complete	  program	  listing	  back	  to	  David’s	  house	  in	  Barnet,	  North	  London	  and	  worked	  their	  way	  through	  it.	  They	  couldn’t	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  logic	  behind	  the	  data	  communications,	  and	  working	  without	  Burroughs’	  support	  they	  decide	  instead	  to	  re-­‐write	  relevant	  sections	  so	  they	  could	  understand	  it.61	  	   They	  re-­‐wrote	  what	  they	  could	  and	  then	  arranged	  for	  it	  to	  be	  typed	  up	  into	  punched	  cards	  the	  following	  week.	  Prior	  to	  one	  scheduled	  test	  session	  on	  the	  B5500,	  the	  two	  Barclays	  men	  approached	  Peter	  Groves,	  the	  Burroughs	  engineer	  responsible	  for	  the	  machine,	  and	  David	  Parsons	  remembers	  explaining	  the	  situation	  to	  him:	  	   You	  know	  we’ve	  been	  having	  trouble	  trying	  to	  make	  the	  telecommunications	  stuff	  work.	  Now	  Peter	  [Atkins]	  and	  I	  have	  written	  a	  whole	  new	  chunk	  of	  code	  for	  the	  operating	  system,	  and	  in	  our	  session	  this	  morning	  I’m	  going	  to	  recompile	  the	  operating	  system	  to	  our	  version.	  I	  know	  that	  means	  that	  because	  it’s	  not	  Burroughs-­‐written	  amendments,	  I	  get	  no	  support;	  so	  I	  don’t	  expect	  any	  support.	  But	  I	  thought	  I	  ought	  to	  tell	  you	  that’s	  what	  I’m	  going	  to	  do.62	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Fisher,	  McKie	  and	  Mancke,	  IBM	  and	  the	  US	  Data	  Processing	  Industry,	  245.	  60	  John	  T.	  Lynch,	  “The	  B8500	  from	  Burroughs”,	  Datamation	  11,	  no.	  8	  (August	  1965):	  49–50.	  61	  David	  Parsons,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Manchester,	  7	  August	  2008.	  62	  Ibid.	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  The	  Burroughs’	  engineer	  is	  remembered	  as	  smiling	  and	  saying,	  “Don’t	  be	  daft,	  of	  course	  I’ll	  support	  you.	  Let’s	  see	  how	  it	  goes.”	  The	  three	  men	  worked	  together	  to	  recompile	  the	  operating	  system	  and	  then	  reinitiated	  the	  machine	  with	  test	  TC	  500s	  in	  place.	  They	  started	  the	  test	  telecommunications	  programmes	  and	  a	  couple	  of	  seconds	  later	  the	  test	  TC	  500s	  started	  to	  chatter.	  The	  informal	  collaboration	  between	  the	  Barclays-­‐Burroughs	  team	  members	  had	  succeeded	  in	  getting	  the	  TC	  500s	  to	  talk	  to	  the	  Burroughs	  computer.	  The	  bank’s	  programmers	  experienced	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  mastery	  and	  exhilaration	  of	  programming	  close	  to	  the	  machine	  described	  by	  Sherry	  Turkle	  in	  The	  Second	  Self	  and	  Steven	  Levy	  in	  Hackers.63	  After	  the	  test,	  Parsons	  and	  Atkins	  submitted	  their	  changes	  to	  Burroughs	  so	  that	  their	  amendments	  could	  be	  incorporated	  formally	  into	  an	  operating	  system	  release.	  When	  the	  release	  was	  issued	  the	  programmers	  were	  proud	  of	  a	  comment	  in	  the	  B5500	  master	  control	  program	  that	  acknowledged	  their	  contribution	  in	  supplying	  this	  code.64	  	  
The	  interpretive	  flexibility	  of	  “real”	  time	  The	  TC	  500s	  may	  have	  been	  talking	  to	  the	  B5500,	  but	  getting	  them	  to	  update	  customer	  accounts	  in	  “real	  time”	  was	  still	  a	  long	  way	  away.	  Challenges	  associated	  with	  real-­‐time	  updating,	  including	  implementing	  restarts	  and	  recoveries,	  also	  had	  to	  be	  tackled.	  The	  real-­‐time	  concept	  had	  been	  open	  to	  a	  number	  of	  different	  interpretations.	  On	  US	  military	  projects	  for	  flight	  simulation	  and	  air-­‐defense	  it	  meant	  an	  immediate	  response	  without	  delay.	  For	  the	  SABRE	  project,	  “real	  time”	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  response	  of	  less	  than	  three	  seconds	  and	  this	  was	  the	  paradigm	  used	  by	  the	  Communications	  of	  the	  ACM	  when	  it	  reported	  the	  newly	  announced	  Barclays-­‐Burroughs	  system	  of	  being	  capable	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Sherry	  Turkle.	  The	  Second	  Self:	  Computers	  and	  the	  Human	  Spirit	  (MIT	  Press,	  2004),	  165–168;	  Steven	  Levy,	  
Hackers:	  Heroes	  of	  the	  Computer	  Revolution	  (Penguin,	  2001).	  64	  David	  Parsons,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Manchester,	  7	  August	  2008.	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providing	  an	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  response	  to	  any	  branch	  transaction	  within	  two	  and	  a	  half	  seconds.65	  	  But	  pragmatic	  concerns	  led	  Barclays	  to	  interpret	  the	  real-­‐time	  concept	  in	  a	  more	  flexible	  manner,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  design	  of	  a	  system	  that	  classified	  branch	  transactions	  according	  to	  one	  of	  three	  different	  levels,	  to	  provide	  an	  “on-­‐time”	  rather	  than	  real-­‐time	  response.	  	  	  The	  first	  level	  consisted	  of	  enquiries	  and	  urgent	  amendments.	  If	  a	  clerk	  in	  the	  branch	  wanted	  to	  make	  an	  enquiry	  –	  a	  read-­‐only	  request	  –	  this	  could	  be	  provided	  straight	  away.	  Certain	  update	  transactions,	  such	  as	  stopping	  a	  cheque,	  were	  classed	  as	  urgent	  amendments	  that	  also	  needed	  to	  be	  done	  straight	  away.	  The	  second	  level	  down	  consisted	  of	  daily	  branch	  accounting	  entries	  to	  customer	  accounts.	  These	  were	  accumulated	  and	  processed	  when	  the	  computer	  was	  not	  busy	  responding	  to	  immediate	  enquires	  or	  updates.	  The	  deadline	  for	  completion	  of	  all	  these	  entries	  on	  the	  computer	  would	  be	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  as	  it	  had	  been	  in	  the	  branch.	  The	  third	  level	  was	  account	  amendments,	  for	  example	  change	  of	  address,	  for	  which	  there	  was	  no	  immediate	  urgency	  within	  the	  day.	  These	  were	  collected	  together	  and	  done	  all	  at	  the	  same	  time	  in	  a	  manner	  akin	  to	  batch	  processing.66	  Progress	  was	  being	  made	  implementing	  the	  “on-­‐time”	  design,	  but	  it	  was	  taking	  longer	  than	  planned	  and	  Barclays’	  programmers	  still	  faced	  a	  number	  of	  challenges.	  Meanwhile	  the	  computer	  centre	  was	  throwing	  up	  fresh	  challenges	  of	  its	  own.	  
A	  computer	  centre	  in	  suburbia	  
Barclays	  had	  quickly	  settled	  on	  an	  old	  motorbike	  warehouse	  at	  Harrow	  Road,	  Willesden	  in	  the	  North	  West	  of	  London	  for	  its	  Burroughs	  Computer	  Centre.67	  Located	  five	  miles	  to	  the	  north	  west	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London,	  see	  Figure	  4,	  the	  centre	  lay	  at	  the	  beginnings	  of	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  “Business	  Notes”,	  Communications	  of	  the	  ACM	  10,	  No.	  5	  (May	  1967):	  330.	  66	  Gerry	  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Macclesfield,	  28	  September	  2008.	  67	  Barclays	  Bank,	  “The	  Story	  of	  Gloucester”,	  Barclaynews,	  1979,	  4.	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suburban	  sprawl	  that	  in	  1924	  the	  Metropolitan	  Railway	  had	  dubbed	  “Metro-­‐land”	  to	  promote	  suburban	  development	  along	  its	  extended	  London	  underground	  Metropolitan	  Line.68	  At	  51,000	  sq.	  ft.,	  the	  computer	  centre	  was	  Barclays’	  biggest	  yet,	  and	  its	  first	  in	  a	  suburban	  as	  opposed	  to	  urban	  location.	  The	  area	  was	  home	  to	  a	  mixture	  of	  the	  light	  industrial	  and	  the	  residential	  and	  consideration	  had	  to	  be	  given	  to	  adequate	  sound	  proofing	  in	  the	  centre’s	  design	  lest	  noise	  from	  its	  standby	  diesel	  generator	  might	  disturb	  residents	  sleeping	  nearby.69	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.	  Detail	  from	  a	  Barclays	  map	  of	  North	  London	  showing	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Burroughs	  
Computer	  Centre	  in	  Willesden	  (numbered	  4)	  in	  relation	  to	  Barclays’	  three	  previous	  branch	  
accounting	  computer	  centres,	  c.	  1968.	  Numbering	  and	  a	  scale	  indicating	  approximately	  1	  mile	  
added.	  All	  other	  annotations	  are	  original.	  Source:	  BGA/B547,	  A	  Map	  of	  London	  Showing	  the	  Branches	  
of	  Barclays	  Bank	  Limited,	  1964.	  
	  It	  wasn’t	  the	  centre’s	  impact	  on	  its	  environment	  that	  would	  be	  Barclays’	  main	  concern,	  it	  was	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  environment	  on	  the	  centre.	  Barclays	  had	  experienced	  problems	  providing	  the	  right	  conditions	  for	  its	  large-­‐scale	  computers	  previously,	  space	  having	  been	  reclaimed	  from	  shops,	  factories	  and	  warehouses.	  The	  cheque	  clearing	  system	  at	  St	  Swithin’s	  House	  consisting	  of	  an	  IBM	  1401	  and	  associated	  cheque	  readers	  had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Peter	  Clarke,	  Hope	  and	  Glory:	  Britain	  1900-­2000	  (Penguin,	  2004),	  149.	  	  69	  “Keeping	  it	  Quiet”,	  Financial	  Times,	  24	  November	  1970,	  11;	  Barclays	  Bank,	  “The	  Story	  of	  Gloucester,”	  
Barclaysnews,	  1979,	  4.	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experienced	  “all	  sorts	  of	  faults	  […]	  because	  the	  electric	  switches	  on	  the	  building’s	  lifts	  were	  interfering	  with	  the	  system.”70	  But	  this	  was	  nothing	  compared	  to	  the	  problems	  Barclays	  experienced	  with	  the	  Burroughs’	  equipment	  installed	  at	  Willesden.	  	  The	  Burroughs’	  computers	  and	  disk	  drives	  suffered	  innumerable	  problems.	  It	  was	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  whether	  these	  problems	  were	  inherent	  to	  the	  Burroughs	  equipment,	  or	  whether	  they	  were	  due	  to	  adverse	  environmental	  conditions.	  Many	  pointed	  a	  finger	  at	  the	  computer	  centre’s	  location,	  sandwiched	  as	  it	  was	  between	  a	  main	  road	  at	  the	  back	  and	  a	  busy	  railway	  junction	  in	  front.	  Vibrations	  from	  fully	  loaded	  freight	  trains	  running	  past	  at	  night	  could	  be	  felt	  throughout	  the	  centre.	  The	  Burroughs’	  machines	  were	  considered	  “very	  sensitive”	  by	  workers	  at	  the	  centre	  and	  the	  building’s	  vibrations	  were	  blamed	  for	  a	  host	  of	  failures.71	  	  There	  was	  also	  a	  suspicion	  that	  other	  environmental	  factors,	  including	  dust	  from	  the	  road	  and	  rail	  traffic	  and	  less	  than	  adequate	  air	  conditioning,	  might	  have	  been	  at	  play.72	  Barclays	  continued	  to	  make	  modifications,	  including	  rubber	  damping	  for	  the	  computer	  floors,	  to	  cater	  for	  the	  site’s	  inadequacies,73	  but	  it	  was	  soon	  clear	  that	  the	  building’s	  location,	  and	  its	  repurposing	  from	  motorcycle	  warehouse	  to	  computer	  centre,	  had	  made	  for	  a	  computing	  environment	  that	  was	  far	  from	  perfect.	  The	  TC	  500s	  in	  the	  branch	  were	  not	  without	  their	  issues	  either.	  Operating	  as	  standalone	  book-­‐keeping	  machines	  they	  were	  initially	  slower	  and	  more	  troublesome	  than	  the	  older	  machines	  that	  they	  replaced.74	  They	  were	  also	  prone	  to	  breakdown	  within	  the	  first	  three	  months.	  Barclays’	  project	  team	  advised	  branches	  that	  a	  “running	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  BGA/725/3,	  Alan	  Duncan,	  interview	  with	  Jessie	  Campbell,	  11	  August	  1998.	  71	  BGA/754/31,	  David	  Bound,	  interview	  with	  Janet	  Sykes,	  19	  October	  1990;	  Derek	  Finnis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  North	  Rode;	  David	  Parsons,	  telephone	  interview	  with	  author,	  Manchester,	  7	  August	  2008.	  72	  Roger	  Jefferyes,	  telephone	  interview	  with	  author,	  3	  August	  2010.	  73	  Jean	  Perkins,	  interview	  with	  author,	  28	  July	  2008;	  John	  Evans,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Congleton,	  22	  July	  2008.	  	  74	  Margaret	  Shilleto,	  telephone	  interview	  with	  author,	  5	  August	  2008.	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period”	  of	  ninety	  days	  was	  required	  after	  which	  the	  breakdown	  rate	  settled	  down	  within	  acceptable	  limits.75	  The	  first	  branches	  to	  be	  connected	  to	  the	  Burroughs	  machine	  at	  Willesden,	  in	  August	  1969,	  suffered	  terrible	  processing	  delays.	  “On-­‐time”	  processing	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  parallel	  to	  the	  branches’	  normal	  book-­‐keeping,	  but	  it	  was	  far	  from	  “on-­‐time”.	  The	  B5500	  computer	  was	  having	  difficulty	  operating	  in	  batch	  update	  mode	  only,	  and	  at	  one	  point	  rumours	  circulated	  at	  the	  GLCC	  that	  colleagues	  at	  Willesden	  were	  doing	  well	  as	  they	  were	  “only	  8	  days	  behind	  with	  their	  processing”.76	  A	  friendly	  rivalry	  was	  developing	  between	  the	  bank’s	  Greater	  London	  Computer	  Centre	  (GLCC)	  –	  its	  IBM	  computer	  centre	  at	  Tottenham	  Court	  Road	  –	  and	  the	  Burroughs	  computer	  centre	  at	  Willesden.	  Some	  in	  the	  Burroughs’	  real-­‐time	  camp	  began	  to	  wonder	  if	  there	  was	  more	  than	  schadenfreude	  occurring	  at	  the	  GLCC,	  as	  rumours	  began	  to	  circulate	  that	  IBM	  was	  using	  Burroughs’	  misfortune	  to	  its	  own	  advantage	  in	  order	  to	  plot	  Burroughs’	  downfall.77	  This	  would	  not	  have	  been	  the	  first	  time	  accusations	  of	  this	  sort	  had	  been	  levelled	  at	  IBM.	  The	  FUD	  (fear,	  uncertainty	  and	  doubt)	  factor	  was	  an	  effective	  weapon	  employed	  against	  IBM	  competitors.78	  	   Then,	  to	  make	  matters	  worse,	  what	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  interim	  solution	  became	  the	  only	  solution	  as	  Burroughs	  pulled	  the	  plug	  on	  the	  B8500	  project	  and	  its	  offer	  of	  two	  B6500s	  became	  the	  only	  offer	  on	  the	  table.	  The	  B6500	  now	  became	  the	  company’s	  flagship	  machine	  as	  it	  now	  billed	  it	  as	  its	  “System	  for	  the	  Seventies”.	  	  Burroughs	  had	  a	  backlog	  of	  60	  firm	  orders	  for	  the	  B6500,	  worth	  a	  total	  of	  $300	  million,	  but	  it	  promised	  Barclays	  and	  the	  Midland	  that	  they	  would	  be	  amongst	  the	  earliest	  to	  receive	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  BGA/758/34,	  “Computers	  –	  Summary”,	  undated.	  76	  Brenda	  Baker,	  interview	  with	  author,	  28	  July	  2008.	  77	  Roger	  Jefferyes,	  telephone	  interview	  with	  author,	  3	  August	  2010;	  BGA/275/3,	  Alan	  Duncan,	  interview	  with	  Jessie	  Campbell,	  11	  August	  1998.	  78	  The	  “FUD	  Factor”	  was	  coined	  in	  1975	  by	  former	  IBM	  employee,	  Gene	  Amdahl,	  who	  left	  to	  set	  up	  a	  competitor	  company	  making	  IBM	  compatible	  computers.	  See	  Richard	  Thomas	  DeLamarter,	  Big	  Blue:	  IBM's	  
Use	  and	  Abuse	  of	  Power	  (Macmillan,	  1986),	  Chapter	  15:	  “The	  FUD	  Factor”.	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system.79	  Nonetheless,	  it	  could	  offer	  no	  better	  estimate	  than	  the	  first	  of	  Barclays’	  two	  machines	  being	  ready	  for	  delivery	  in	  June	  1969.	  With	  significant	  investment	  already	  made	  in	  the	  project,	  Barclays	  was	  not	  about	  to	  give	  up	  and	  pressed	  ahead	  and	  accepted	  Burroughs	  offer	  of	  the	  two	  B6500s.	  Burroughs	  also	  attempted	  to	  broker	  the	  same	  deal	  with	  the	  National	  Provincial,	  but	  this	  bank	  pulled	  out	  of	  its	  commitment	  to	  Burroughs	  large-­‐scale	  computer,	  in	  part	  due	  to	  its	  impending	  merger	  with	  the	  Westminster	  bank	  which	  had	  invested	  heavily	  in	  IBM.	  The	  new	  National	  Westminster	  bank	  would	  go	  forward	  with	  a	  hybrid	  of	  IBM	  computers	  linked	  to	  Burroughs’	  terminals.	  The	  Midland,	  like	  Barclays,	  persevered	  with	  an	  all-­‐Burroughs	  solution.80	  
Real-­time	  dystopia	  
When	  initial	  plans	  for	  the	  real-­‐time	  project	  had	  been	  drawn	  up	  mid-­‐way	  through	  1967,	  project	  managers	  had	  hoped	  to	  link	  the	  first	  branches	  to	  the	  Burroughs	  machine	  by	  August	  1969.	  After	  this	  first	  milestone	  was	  reached,	  they	  anticipated	  rolling	  out	  real-­‐time	  automation	  to	  the	  remainder	  of	  Barclays’	  branch	  network	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1970.	  However,	  an	  announced	  merger	  with	  a	  smaller	  bank,	  Martins,	  in	  1968	  added	  a	  further	  732	  branches	  to	  Barclays’	  2,612.81	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  accommodate	  these	  extra	  branches	  into	  existing	  real-­‐time	  plans.82	  Side-­‐stepping	  the	  challenges	  thrown	  up	  by	  the	  merger	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  problems	  thus	  far,	  Barclays	  remained	  optimistic	  that	  the	  original	  project	  plan	  was	  achievable.	  In	  spite	  of	  teething	  troubles,	  connection	  of	  the	  first	  two	  branches,	  Watford	  Junction	  in	  Luton	  District	  and	  Chorleywood	  in	  Oxford	  District,	  to	  the	  Burroughs	  B5500	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  BGA/758/34,	  “Burroughs	  Reports”,	  December	  1969.	  80	  Ted	  Schoeters,	  “1971	  Target	  for	  Computer	  Networks”,	  Financial	  Times,	  20	  October	  1969,	  14.	  81	  Ackrill	  and	  Hannah,	  Barclays,	  182.	  82	  Ted	  Schoeters,	  “Barclays	  D-­‐Day	  Computer	  Plan	  Suffers	  Serious	  Setback”,	  Financial	  Times,	  27	  February	  1970,	  23.	  Further	  ramifications	  of	  the	  Barclays	  and	  Martins	  merger	  are	  considered	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	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computer	  at	  Willesden	  on	  9	  August	  1969,	  provided	  the	  team	  with	  a	  much-­‐need	  boost.	  But	  a	  number	  of	  other	  teething	  problems	  caused	  those	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  project	  to	  admit	  that	  the	  branches’	  initial	  experiences	  of	  the	  new	  system	  were	  bad.	  The	  two	  branches	  continued	  to	  run	  their	  mechanised	  in-­‐branch	  book-­‐keeping	  in	  parallel	  with	  the	  new	  system	  as	  Barclays	  worked	  with	  Burroughs	  to	  try	  and	  iron	  the	  problems	  out.83	  Amidst	  the	  environmental	  problems	  at	  Willesden,	  and	  the	  challenges	  of	  programming	  for	  real-­‐time,	  Burroughs	  announced	  that	  delivery	  of	  the	  first	  B6500	  would	  be	  at	  first	  four,	  and	  then	  nine	  months	  late.	  It	  looked	  unlikely	  that	  Barclays	  would	  have	  its	  B6500	  installed	  and	  working	  before	  October	  1970.	  Burroughs	  promised	  Barclays	  another	  B5500	  free	  of	  charge,84	  but	  as	  replacements	  for	  the	  B6500s	  the	  B5500s	  were	  woefully	  inadequate	  for	  the	  job.	  In	  comparison	  to	  the	  specifications	  for	  the	  never-­‐to-­‐materialise	  B8500	  they	  were	  chronically	  underpowered.	  Barclays	  had	  connected	  eleven	  branches	  to	  the	  first	  B5500	  and	  envisaged	  connecting	  only	  another	  twenty	  four	  more	  to	  that	  machine	  before	  it	  would	  be	  running	  at	  its	  capacity.	  A	  quick	  calculation	  estimated	  that	  Barclays	  would	  need	  a	  hundred	  B5500s	  to	  cope	  with	  all	  its	  branches.85	  Even	  with	  a	  B6500	  installed	  and	  running	  by	  October	  1970,	  Barclays’	  best	  estimate	  was	  that	  there	  would	  be	  fifty	  more	  branches	  on	  that	  machine	  before	  “D-­‐Day”.	  Whilst	  Barclays’	  programming	  manager	  insisted	  “[t]here	  is	  nothing	  wrong	  with	  the	  Burroughs	  system	  as	  such,	  and	  when	  installed	  it	  will	  provide	  us	  with	  the	  most	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  computer	  network	  in	  the	  world”,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  project’s	  deadline	  was	  not	  going	  to	  be	  met.86	  	  The	  all-­‐important	  “D-­‐Day”	  for	  decimalisation	  was	  now	  cast	  as	  an	  interim	  milestone	  by	  which	  time	  all	  the	  branch	  accounting	  equipment	  not	  suitable	  for	  decimal	  conversion	  had	  to	  have	  been	  replaced	  with	  Burroughs	  TC	  500s.	  Overall	  project	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  BGA/758/32,	  “Suggested	  Basis	  for	  Local	  Head	  Office	  Circulars	  to	  Branches”,	  undated.	  84	  Ibid.	  85	  Gerry	  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Macclesfield,	  26	  September	  2008;	  Brian	  Hull,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Wilmslow,	  21	  October	  2008.	  86	  BGA/758/32,	  “Suggested	  Basis	  for	  Local	  Head	  Office	  Circulars	  to	  Branches”,	  undated.	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completion	  was	  now	  shifted	  to	  the	  winter	  of	  1971	  with	  the	  technical	  team	  anticipating	  working	  flat	  out	  once	  the	  B6500s	  had	  been	  delivered.87	  With	  “D-­‐Day”	  fast	  approaching,	  Barclays’	  main	  efforts	  were	  now	  redirected	  towards	  the	  IBM	  installation	  at	  the	  GLCC,	  where	  IBM	  personnel	  were	  only	  too	  happy	  to	  provide	  assistance	  and	  another	  S/360	  machine.88	  Programmers	  supplied	  by	  CAP	  (Computer	  Analysts	  and	  Programmers)	  were	  brought	  in	  to	  begin	  work	  writing	  a	  version	  “2b”	  of	  Barclays’	  branch	  accounting	  programmes	  to	  run	  on	  the	  IBM	  mainframes.	  The	  new	  programmes	  improved	  the	  speed,	  capacity,	  reliability	  and	  security	  of	  the	  system,	  but	  updates	  to	  customer	  accounts	  would	  still	  be	  made	  in	  batch	  overnight.89	  	  	  By	  decimalisation	  day,	  rather	  than	  acting	  as	  the	  hub	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  branch	  network,	  the	  Burroughs	  computer	  centre	  at	  Willesden	  was	  serving	  only	  30	  bank	  branches	  and	  was	  limping	  along	  in	  batch	  mode	  rather	  than	  real-­‐time.	  The	  Barclays-­‐Burroughs	  relationship	  had	  gone	  sour,	  and	  Barclays’	  senior	  management	  were	  looking	  for	  a	  way	  out	  while	  trying	  to	  keep	  the	  bank’s	  dignity	  intact.	  For	  a	  while	  Barclays	  kept	  the	  Burroughs	  B6500s	  -­‐	  which	  were	  upgraded	  to	  B6700s	  -­‐	  at	  Willesden,	  and	  attempted	  to	  get	  them	  to	  operate	  like	  IBM’s	  S/360	  machines.	  CAP	  produced	  an	  S/360	  emulation	  programme	  for	  the	  Burroughs’	  machines,	  but	  predictably	  it	  ran	  slowly.90	  Plans	  to	  install	  any	  further	  large-­‐scale	  Burroughs	  computers	  were	  shelved,	  and	  almost	  all	  effort	  was	  directed	  back	  into	  the	  well-­‐established	  batch	  mode	  of	  working	  on	  IBM	  machine.	  Only	  a	  small	  programming	  team	  remained	  working	  on	  the	  Burroughs’	  real-­‐time	  project.91	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  BGA/758/34,	  “Computers	  –	  Summary”,	  undated.	  88	  Gerry	  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Macclesfield,	  26	  September	  2008.	  89	  Brian	  Hull,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Wilmslow,	  21	  October	  2008;	  Gerry	  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Macclesfield,	  28	  September	  2008;	  “Barclays/CAP	  Team	  Builds	  Big	  Accounting	  Package”,	  Financial	  Times,	  3	  September	  1970,	  13.	  90	  Gerry	  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Macclesfield,	  26	  September	  2008.	  91	  David	  Parsons,	  interview	  with	  author,	  7	  August	  2008;	  Gerry	  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Macclesfield,	  26	  September	  2008.	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Barclays	  was	  not	  the	  only	  British	  bank	  that	  suffered	  with	  Burroughs.	  The	  Midland	  suffered	  too.	  Its	  optimistically	  named	  “Project	  70”,	  later	  re-­‐titled	  the	  “Online	  Computer	  System”,	  was	  plagued	  with	  similar	  setbacks,	  but	  it	  persevered	  after	  Barclays	  had	  cancelled	  its	  project.92	  In	  the	  US,	  Trans	  World	  Airlines	  (TWA)	  was	  also	  experiencing	  major	  difficulties	  with	  Burroughs.	  The	  machines	  it	  had	  delivered	  to	  run	  its	  real-­‐time	  airline	  reservations	  system	  were	  underpowered	  and	  unreliable.	  The	  Burroughs’	  system	  was	  never	  operational	  and	  TWA	  sued	  the	  company	  while	  it	  replaced	  its	  machines	  with	  high-­‐end	  System/360	  computers	  from	  IBM.93	  Of	  all	  the	  big	  British	  clearing	  banks	  it	  was	  only	  Lloyds	  that	  managed	  to	  have	  all	  its	  branches	  connected	  on-­‐line	  to	  a	  computer	  by	  decimalisation	  day.94	  Lloyd’s	  achievement	  was	  significant,	  but	  Barclays’	  technicians	  were	  keen	  to	  point	  out	  that	  it	  wasn’t	  the	  on-­‐line	  real-­time	  system	  to	  which	  Barclays	  had	  aspired.95	  Lloyds	  had	  decided	  to	  go	  for	  the	  more	  achievable	  goal	  of	  an	  on-­‐line	  system	  where	  the	  branch	  was	  connected	  to	  the	  computer	  centre	  via	  telephone	  line	  and	  entries	  were	  made	  and	  stored	  on	  the	  computer	  during	  the	  day.	  Updates	  were	  still	  applied	  in	  batch	  overnight	  rather	  than	  in	  real	  time	  as	  the	  clerk	  entered	  them	  in	  the	  branch.96	  Lloyds’	  task	  was	  also	  made	  all	  the	  more	  manageable	  because	  it	  was	  the	  smallest	  of	  the	  “Big	  Five”	  banks	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  size	  of	  its	  assets	  and	  the	  size	  of	  its	  branch	  network.	  And,	  of	  all	  the	  clearing	  banks,	  only	  Lloyds	  had	  chosen	  an	  all-­‐IBM	  solution.	  It	  had	  remained	  faithful	  to	  IBM	  as	  its	  computer	  supplier	  all	  the	  way	  through	  the	  1960s,	  and	  as	  result	  enjoyed	  some	  stability	  during	  a	  period	  of	  continual	  technical	  change.	  Unlike	  Barclays	  and	  Midland	  the	  stability	  of	  this	  relationship	  also	  provided	  for	  a	  long	  and	  continuous	  period	  of	  learning	  for	  those	  involved	  on	  both	  sides.	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  Gerry	  Jarvis,	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  with	  author,	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  26	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  2008.	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  Fisher,	  McKie	  and	  Mancke,	  IBM	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  the	  US	  Data	  Processing	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  Booth,	  “Technical	  Change	  in	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  Banking	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  1945-­‐1975”,	  295.	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Closure	  By	  1972,	  Barclays’	  real-­‐time	  project	  was	  beginning	  to	  look	  like	  a	  failure.	  What	  had	  to	  be	  done	  now	  was	  to	  construct	  it	  to	  be	  something	  else.	  On	  15	  December	  1972,	  Barclays	  publicly	  announced	  that	  its	  remaining	  large-­‐scale	  Burroughs	  computers	  were	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  IBM	  machines.97	  Salvaging	  what	  it	  could	  from	  the	  project,	  Barclays	  didn’t	  sever	  all	  links	  with	  Burroughs	  and	  the	  real-­‐time	  project,	  however.	  It	  kept	  the	  technically	  elegant	  TC	  500s	  in	  the	  branches	  linked	  to	  IBM	  computers	  at	  the	  GLCC	  and	  Willesden.	  This	  meant	  that,	  in	  part	  at	  least,	  the	  project	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  success.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  money	  Barclays	  had	  invested	  in	  the	  real-­‐time	  project	  had	  been	  on	  the	  TC	  500	  terminals	  in	  the	  branches	  and	  these	  remained,	  but	  now	  connected	  to	  IBM	  mainframes.	  They	  were	  fulfilling	  an	  important	  function	  for	  the	  bank,	  but	  not	  the	  real-­‐time	  function	  that	  had	  originally	  been	  envisaged.	  Barclays’	  merger	  with	  Martins	  in	  1969	  had	  increased	  the	  size	  of	  its	  branch	  network	  and	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  its	  technology,	  exacerbating	  existing	  difficulties.	  However,	  it	  was	  also	  the	  merger	  with	  Martins	  that	  offered	  Barclays	  a	  way	  out	  of	  its	  predicament	  publicly	  with	  some	  semblance	  of	  grace.	  Amongst	  the	  external	  factors	  cited	  in	  an	  internal	  memo	  as	  responsible	  for	  the	  ongoing	  project	  delay	  was	  the	  merger	  between	  Barclays	  and	  Martins	  bank.98	  This	  internal	  memo	  formed	  the	  basis	  for	  Alan	  Duncan’s	  public	  response	  when	  interviewed	  by	  the	  Financial	  Times.	  The	  newspaper	  reported	  Duncan	  as	  giving	  this	  explanation	  for	  continuing	  project	  delays:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  “Barclays	  Making	  a	  Major	  Change”,	  Financial	  Times,	  15	  December	  1972,	  10.	  98	  BGA/758/32,	  “Suggested	  Basis	  for	  Local	  Head	  Office	  Circulars	  to	  Branches”.	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  [T]he	  major	  setback	  could	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  merger	  with	  Martin’s	  [sic]	  Bank.	  Prior	  to	  that	  merger,	  things	  were	  going	  smoothly	  and	  Barclays	  expected	  to	  have	  completed	  its	  huge	  3,000+	  branch	  network	  all	  linked	  to	  a	  giant	  Burroughs	  B-­‐8500	  computer	  costing	  £4m.99	  	  Merger	  also	  offered	  Barclays	  final	  closure.	  Although	  from	  the	  outside	  the	  merger	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  takeover	  of	  Barclays	  by	  Martins,	  on	  the	  inside	  there	  was	  a	  feeling	  of	  the	  reverse.	  In	  the	  computing	  division	  the	  merger	  was	  experienced	  as	  more	  of	  a	  takeover	  of	  Barclays	  by	  Martins.100	  Amongst	  those	  from	  Martins	  taking	  up	  senior	  positions	  in	  Barclays	  was	  the	  man	  with	  overall	  responsibility	  for	  breaking	  Martins’	  computing	  constraints	  in	  Liverpool,	  Warwick	  Broadbent.	  Broadbent	  was	  appointed	  head	  of	  Barclays	  computing	  department	  which	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade	  was	  approximately	  200	  strong.101	  	  	  With	  a	  Martins’	  manager	  now	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  merged	  bank’s	  computing	  division	  there	  was	  a	  chance	  for	  this	  new	  broom	  to	  sweep	  things	  clean.	  Between	  the	  two	  banks	  they	  were	  running	  computers	  manufactured	  by	  five	  different	  suppliers	  all	  purchased	  in	  the	  space	  of	  a	  decade.	  The	  new	  man	  in	  charge	  was	  given	  the	  job	  to	  rationalise	  these	  assets.	  Replacing	  the	  Burroughs’	  computers	  with	  IBM	  machines,	  it	  was	  argued,	  was	  the	  rational	  thing	  to	  do.	  By	  1974,	  all	  of	  the	  Burroughs	  computers	  been	  removed	  from	  Willesden.102	  The	  Burroughs	  Computer	  Centre	  was	  now	  the	  Willesden	  Computer	  Centre.	  Barclays	  confessed	  to	  losing	  £4	  million	  on	  the	  project	  –	  the	  original	  order	  price	  of	  the	  B8500	  –	  which	  Ackrill	  and	  Hannah,	  authors	  of	  the	  bank’s	  official	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  Ted	  Schoeters,	  “Barclays	  D-­‐Day	  Computer	  Plan	  Suffers	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  Financial	  Times,	  27	  February	  1970,	  23.	  100	  Gerry	  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	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  September	  2008.	  101	  BGA/275/3,	  Alan	  Duncan,	  interview	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  BGA/754/31,	  David	  Bound,	  interview	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  Janet	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  Gerry	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  author,	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history,	  suggest	  the	  bank	  put	  down	  to	  experience.103	  	  Elsewhere	  the	  Midland	  and	  Barclays	  estimated	  between	  them	  that	  the	  Burroughs	  debacle	  had	  cost	  £16m	  in	  lost	  savings.104	  	  Publicly	  Barclays	  may	  have	  reached	  closure,	  but	  privately	  those	  working	  closest	  to	  the	  Burroughs	  machines	  couldn’t	  understand	  the	  decision	  to	  cancel	  the	  project.	  What	  was	  left	  of	  Barclays’	  Burroughs	  programming	  team,	  was	  reluctant	  to	  give	  up	  on	  the	  Burroughs	  real-­‐time	  project,	  and	  insisted	  they	  were	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  a	  working	  real-­‐time	  system.	  Decades	  later,	  they	  still	  struggled	  to	  explain	  its	  demise.	  A	  number	  of	  the	  team	  felt	  let	  down	  by	  senior	  managers	  and	  maintained	  that	  given	  six	  more	  months	  they	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  deliver	  the	  system	  the	  bank	  deserved.	  Many	  of	  those	  involved	  couldn’t	  understand	  why	  the	  project	  had	  been	  shelved	  now	  that	  they	  had	  come	  so	  far.105	  Looking	  back	  and	  searching	  for	  explanations	  the	  majority	  view	  from	  those	  working	  on	  the	  system	  was	  that	  Burroughs’	  real-­‐time	  technology	  was	  simply	  “too	  far	  ahead	  of	  its	  time”.106	  	  Barclays’	  official	  history	  concurs	  and	  suggests	  that	  senior	  management	  attributed	  no	  blame	  to	  anyone	  inside	  the	  bank	  for	  the	  Burroughs	  affair.107	  Many	  years	  on	  this	  is	  still	  a	  sensitive	  issue,	  but	  my	  research	  suggests	  that	  notions	  of	  blame	  at	  the	  time	  weren’t	  entirely	  absent.	  Whether	  it	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  causation	  or	  correlation,	  the	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  Roger	  Vielvoye,	  “Computer	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  Times,	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  author,	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  interview	  with	  author,	  Macclesfield,	  26	  September	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  interview	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  author,	  5	  August	  2008.	  106	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  example,	  Brian	  Hull,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Wilmslow,	  21	  October	  2008;	  BGA/725/3,	  Alan	  Duncan,	  interview	  with	  Jessie	  Campbell,	  11	  August	  1998;	  Stan	  Gray,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Haslington,	  22	  July	  2008.	  107	  Ackrill	  and	  Hannah,	  Barclays,	  332–334.	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innovators	  from	  the	  technical	  team	  were	  given	  research	  roles	  or	  moved	  to	  other	  areas	  away	  from	  the	  operational	  frontline.108	  
Conclusion	  
In	  Computer	  Campbell-­‐Kelly	  and	  Aspray	  contend	  that	  it	  was	  inertia	  from	  archaic	  batch-­‐oriented	  accounting	  methods	  that	  prevented	  innovations	  such	  as	  real-­‐time	  accounting	  in	  banking	  taking	  place.109	  Furthermore,	  they	  suggest	  that	  the	  banks	  had	  no	  need	  for	  real-­‐time	  computing	  until	  the	  introduction	  of	  ATMs.	  The	  pursuit	  of	  real-­‐time	  banking	  for	  three	  of	  the	  British	  banks	  was	  influenced	  by	  a	  number	  of	  factors,	  none	  of	  which	  was	  the	  contemporaneous	  introduction	  of	  ATMs.	  Rather,	  the	  need	  was	  constructed	  out	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  manufacturer	  marketing,	  enforced	  change,	  and	  the	  allure	  of	  a	  technical	  ideal.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  because	  this	  episode	  was	  considered	  one	  best	  forgotten	  according	  to	  Barclays’	  official	  history,110	  that	  the	  “failure”	  of	  real-­‐time	  computing	  in	  banking	  in	  the	  1960s	  has	  been	  written	  out	  of	  the	  history	  of	  computing.	  	  Graeme	  Gooday	  and	  Kenneth	  Lipartito	  both	  warn	  historians	  against	  preserving	  binary	  distinctions	  between	  “success”	  and	  “failure”.111	  “Failure”	  was	  certainly	  not	  a	  category	  used	  by	  the	  actors	  involved	  in	  this	  case.	  Archival	  material	  in	  Barclays	  Group	  Archives	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  project	  failure,	  as	  one	  might	  expect,	  and	  the	  closest	  any	  of	  the	  interviewees	  came	  to	  talking	  of	  the	  project	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  failure	  was	  referring	  to	  another	  project	  in	  the	  same	  breath	  as	  “another	  failure”.	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  debate	  notions	  of	  the	  project’s	  success	  and	  failure,	  but	  conclude	  by	  considering	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	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  Brian	  Hull,	  interview	  with	  author,	  Wilmslow,	  21	  October	  2008;	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  Jarvis,	  interview	  with	  author,	  26	  September	  2008.	  109	  Campbell-­‐Kelly	  and	  Aspray,	  Computer,	  175.	  110	  Ackrill	  and	  Hannah,	  Barclays,	  332-­‐334.	  111	  See	  Graeme	  Gooday,	  “Re-­‐writing	  the	  ‘Book	  of	  Blots’:	  Critical	  Reflections	  on	  Histories	  of	  ‘Technological	  Failure’,	  History	  and	  Technology	  14	  (1998):	  265–291	  and	  Kenneth	  Lipartito,	  “Picturephone	  and	  the	  Information	  Age:	  The	  Social	  Meaning	  of	  Failure”,	  Technology	  and	  Culture	  44,	  no.	  1	  (2003):	  50–81.	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the	  project’s	  unsuccessful	  outcome	  as	  something	  more	  than	  a	  necessary	  lesson	  for	  those	  involved	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  project.	  	  Lipartito	  see	  both	  failures	  and	  non-­‐failures	  as	  “socially	  resonant”	  and	  capable	  of	  shaping	  future	  options.112	  The	  explanation	  given	  by	  those	  in	  the	  community	  of	  practice	  working	  close	  to	  the	  machine	  was	  echoed	  by	  the	  wider	  rhetoric	  of	  real-­‐time.	  At	  a	  macro	  level,	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Barclays-­‐Burroughs	  real-­‐time	  project	  did	  not	  weaken	  the	  desire	  for	  real-­‐time	  banking	  technology	  and	  the	  cashless	  society;	  it	  merely	  modified	  the	  parameters	  required	  for	  its	  success.	  Commentating	  on	  the	  episode,	  the	  British	  banking	  journal,	  The	  Banker,	  concluded	  that:	  	  Until	  stores,	  garages	  and	  so	  on	  each	  have	  terminals	  on-­‐line,	  real-­‐time	  to	  the	  same	  computer	  system	  as	  the	  banks[,]	  cheques	  and	  credits	  outstanding	  with	  them	  will	  distort	  the	  condition	  of	  individual	  accounts	  […]	  The	  distortion	  is	  all	  the	  more	  evident	  if	  other	  banks	  are	  not	  participating	  in	  the	  system.	  This	  said,	  all	  the	  British	  clearing	  banks	  would	  agree	  that	  real-­‐time	  will	  be	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  sometime	  in	  the	  future,	  but	  when	  planned	  and	  implemented	  on	  a	  national	  scale	  rather	  than	  when	  introduced	  piecemeal	  by	  individual	  financial	  institutions.113	  
	  
The	  Banker	  did	  not	  call	  into	  question	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  real-­‐time	  banking,	  just	  how	  and	  when	  it	  might	  happen.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  Barclays-­‐Burroughs’	  real-­‐time	  project	  signified	  a	  change	  in	  the	  technological	  path	  leading	  towards	  real-­‐time	  banking	  and	  the	  cashless	  society.	  It	  was	  not	  declared	  a	  dead	  end;	  it	  just	  needed	  someone	  else	  to	  find	  the	  way.	  It	  was	  left	  to	  the	  savings	  banks,	  devoid	  of	  the	  temporal	  distortions	  of	  cheques	  and	  the	  clearing	  system,	  to	  pioneer	  real-­‐time	  computing	  for	  British	  banking	  in	  the	  1970s.114	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  Lipartito,	  “Picturephone	  and	  the	  Information	  Age”,	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Forty	  years	  later,	  the	  dream	  of	  the	  cashless	  society	  lives	  on	  for	  those	  who	  continue	  to	  have	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  making	  this	  dream	  a	  reality.115	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  example	  Steve	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  Visa	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